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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he only way to avoid stalemate, reduce the need for litigation, and
restore the credibility . . . is to generate agreement on how to handle the
problems that confront us.”1
How much a public company should pay its chief executive should be
“an issue of modest importance for most companies.”2 Yet few issues in the
history of the modern corporation have attracted as much attention as
executive compensation.3
Public outrage at outsize payments to executives, especially those
receiving federal bailouts and loan guarantees, has made executive
compensation a political issue.4 In addition, there is concern that
compensation practices may have led to the current financial crisis. There is
tremendous pressure on the President, Congress, and federal regulatory
agencies to regulate executive pay. Finally, there is little evidence that large
pay packages improve corporate performance.5



1 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 13 (1987). Note that
Susskind and Cruikshank are referring to disputes over public policy. Id. But, given the
central role that public corporations play in today’s economy, the numerous stakeholders
affected by corporate behavior—including employees, creditors, customers, suppliers,
and the community—and corporations’ power to self-regulate, corporate disputes today
are more akin to public disputes than private disputes.
2 John F. Olson, Is the Sky Really Falling? Shareholder-Centric Versus DirectorCentric Corporate Governance, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 295, 303 (2008).
3 See Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where
We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 1 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 44–2004, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305 (“Few issues in the history of
the modern corporation have attracted the international attention garnered by what the
largest corporations pay their top executives.”).
4 See, e.g., Eric Dash & Jonathan D. Glater, Paid Handsomely to Stay, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2009, at B1; Stephen Labaton & Vikas Bajaj, In Curbing Pay, Obama Seeks to
Alter Corporate Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A1.
5 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers, & Urs Peyer, The CEO Pay Slice
(Harv. L. Sch. and Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 574, Oct. 2009),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/CEOpayslice.Oct2009.pdf
(arguing that the larger the CEO’s share of total executive compensation the worse the
firm performs); Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen, & P. Raghavendra Rau, Performance
for Pay? The Relationship Between CEO Incentive Compensation and Future Stock Price
Performance, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CEOperformance122509.pdf/.
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The universe of solutions proposed to date includes federal and state
action. Change is likely, but federal regulation of compensation is not the
best solution. Federal regulation will disappoint shareholders, executives,
employees, and the public. It may stifle innovation, and, arguably, corporate
performance for years to come.6 Instead of focusing on their core business,
executives may spend time devising schemes to avoid the reach of federal
regulators.7 The federal government already adopted strict rules for
compensation of executives in firms that received federal assistance under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). But TARP rules apply only to
companies that have not yet repaid the assistance received, prompting most
to pay the balance as soon as they could, and in some cases sooner. More
broadly applicable federal rules are still under consideration.8
Professors Bebchuk and Fried proposed amending state corporate laws,
giving shareholders the power to propose charter amendments, corporate
reorganizations and combinations, and expanding their rights to nominate
directors.9 However welcome, the focus of these changes is both too narrow
and too broad. The focus is too narrow because Bebchuk and Fried focus
solely on executives’ incentives and shareholder voting, and yet the evidence
suggests that the power of shareholders to affect corporate behavior is very
limited.10 The focus on expanding voting rights is too broad because the
power to control executive pay would also make it easier to direct firms
myopically to focus on short-term share-price appreciation at the expense of
long-term growth.11


6 Alternately, congressional regulation might just further increase CEO pay, as did

the cap on deductibility of golden parachutes and non-performance related pay in excess
of $1 million. See Jensen et al., supra note 3, at 30.
7 For example, there is evidence that subjecting only recipients of TARP funds to
compensation oversight encouraged banks to pay back the government as soon as they
could, instead of when repayment would be optimal.
8 France and the United Kingdom, for example, have already adopted a fifty percent
tax on executive bonuses that exceed a specified amount (25,000 GPB). See Sara S.
Munoz, David Gauthier-Villars & Martin Vaughan, France Joins U.K. Bonus Tax; Not
Germany, U.S., WALL. ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at A10, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704193004574588223449160530.html/.
9 See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006).
10 This is not the case for large shareholders that can and do affect corporate policy,
through informal channels rather than formally.
11 See, e.g., Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too Much?,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13 (arguing that executive pay packages are the “overarching cause” of the financial crisis). Samuelson and Stout state:
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Although executive compensation does not generate many formal
disputes, it generates substantial conflict between executives and
shareholders, employees, the public at-large, and the government. Corporate
directors, who are expected to negotiate executive pay on behalf of the
shareholders, have noted that they “are having trouble controlling the size of
CEO compensation.”12 Shareholders have filed lawsuits, voted to oust
directors who have approved excessive executive pay packages, and
proposed shareholder resolutions, all without much effect. Employees have,
for the most part, protested in silence, except for a few labor unions that
have, as shareholders, challenged executive compensation.13 The public atlarge, represented to some extent through the media, has been keenly
interested in the issue. Yet media reports alone have not been effective in
curbing executive pay either. Congress responded by regulating aspects of
executive pay, by limiting the deductibility of non-performance-related pay
on the corporate tax return, and by overseeing pay in corporations receiving
financial assistance from the federal government,14 but Congress remains
ineffective when it comes to resolving particular controversies. An
alternative approach to fixing executive compensation is to expand the use of


This collective myopia had many causes. One cause . . . was the demands of the
very shareholders who are now suffering most from the stock market’s collapse. It is
extremely difficult for an outside investor to gauge whether a company is making
sound, long-term investments by training employees, improving customer service, or
developing promising new products. By comparison, it’s easy to see whether the
stock price went up today. As a result, institutional and individual investors alike
became preoccupied with quarterly earnings forecasts and short-term share price
changes, and were quick to challenge the management of any bank or corporation
that failed to “maximize shareholder value.”

Id.
12 CORPORATE BOARD MEMBER & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, WHAT DIRECTORS
THINK 8 (2007).
13 See, e.g., Diane E. Lewis, Labor Unions Wage Battle Over CEO Pay, THE
JOURNAL RECORD, Apr. 19, 1999, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4182/is_19990419/ai_n10127670/.
14 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 8211 (1993).
Under the Act, only $1 million in compensation for each of top five executive officers of
the corporation is deductible as a business expense. Pay in excess of $1 million is
deductible only if incentive based, if certain conditions are met. See IRC
§§ 162(m)(4)(B)–(C) (1995); see also Lucian Bebchuk, Congress Gets Punitive on
Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at A15.
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negotiation in designing executive pay by involving stakeholders in the
process.15
This Article argues, very much like Norman Veasey, former Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, that executive compensation “is all
about process.”16 This article analyzes the process for setting executive
pay—in particular how the existing process is ineffective and consistently
leads to suboptimal outcomes. Corporate governance generally and executive
compensation in particular are novel topics of study for dispute systems
design, which to date has mostly focused on organizational disputes and
consensus building.17
Therefore, in Part I, this Article provides a brief history of executive
compensation and describes how the process for setting executive pay
consistently leads to overpayment. Overpayment of executives, particularly
at a time when the firm has underperformed, usually creates resentment
within the corporation and generates conflict.
In Part II, the Article focuses more specifically on disputes about
executive compensation. It briefly presents the existing regime for resolving
disputes over executive pay, demonstrates that the vast majority of disputes
are never brought to light (i.e., latent disputes), and elaborates on the costs of
the existing regime for setting executive pay. The costs include both the
direct costs of overpayment and the costs of conflict generated by
overpayment.
Because conflict over executive pay is common, and the costs of conflict
significant, one would expect that corporate executives, shareholders,
directors, and other parties would have already negotiated about improving
executive pay practices. The fact that corporations have not come up with


15 In response to public outrage about paying almost $17 billion in bonuses for 2009,

Goldman Sachs recently attempted to negotiate shareholder support for their proposed
plan. Although Goldman Sachs’ ultimate goal was to receive endorsement of its proposed
plan and not shareholder input, it nevertheless modified slightly the pay packages it
would provide to its top-paid executives. See Jenny Anderson, Goldman Sachs Alters Its
Bonus Policy to Quell Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/business/11goldman.html/.
16 E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 447 (2003) (emphasis
added). It is unlikely that Justice Veasey was thinking about what dispute systems design
(DSD) could do for compensation setting practices, but if process is what matters, then
DSD, as a discipline that helps design appropriate processes for different types of
decisions, could be helpful.
17 See, e.g., CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY
ORGANIZATIONS (1996); SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 1.
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better solutions is sometimes used as evidence that the existing regime must
be efficient. Relying on dispute resolution theory, this Article argues in Part
III that this is not necessarily so.18 This Article notes that barriers to
compromise will prevent corporations from initiating value-increasing
negotiations and describes those barriers in more detail as they apply to
disputes over executive pay. Finally, the Article proposes steps that a
company interested in rethinking its process for negotiating executives’
salaries should take to reduce the overall costs of disputes over executive
compensation, by increasing participation, and thereby improve the system
for setting executive pay.

I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: HISTORY, PRACTICES, AND PROBLEMS
Executive salaries have occupied a prominent place in the public debate
over corporate responsibility for decades, but this was not always the case.
The following sections on the history of executive pay and pay-setting
practices explain how, when, and why executive compensation became a
source of conflict.

A. History of Executive Compensation as a Source of Conflict
Executive compensation was not an issue until the early twentieth
century when large corporations, such as General Electric, U.S. Steel, and
International Harvester, began to dominate the economy.19 These
corporations were so large that they required investment from many sources
and could no longer be managed by their owners.20 Instead, corporate
executives were hired to manage the new enterprises. Like owner-managers,
they had authority and control over the corporation, including the ability to
set the amount of their own pay. Unlike owner-managers, however, nonowner executives usually held only a tiny stake in the company they


18 See generally WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG,
GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT
(1988).
19 DONALD P. DELVES, STOCK OPTIONS AND THE NEW RULES OF CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: MEASURING, MANAGING, AND REWARDING EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE
19 (2004).
20 Id. at 19–20.
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managed.21 As a result, it was in their interest to extract a high salary today,
even if it came at the expense of lower firm value tomorrow.22
The first recorded controversy over executive compensation dates from
the 1920s. Bethlehem Steel Corporation disclosed that it paid its President,
Eugene G. Grace, annual bonuses that “reached $1,000,000 to $1,500,000.”23
The New York Times charged that these were “unheard of sums as
bonuses.”24 Since then, American business press has followed executive
compensation,25 but executive pay truly became an “issue du jour” in the late
1980s.26
Professor Clark noted in his 1986 treatise on corporate law that CEOs of
large public corporations were paid “handsomely”27 and discussed whether a
salary that is twenty-two to thirty-six times greater than a salary of a typical
worker is “excessive.”28 In 1992, an election year, executive compensation
became a favorite topic for politicians of both parties.29 During his campaign
to become President, then-Governor Bill Clinton promised to tax excessive
pay,30 and he did.31 There was less opposition to executive compensation
during the bull years of the 1990s and 2000. Since then, congressmen,
policymakers, and academics alike have raised concerns about executive pay,
particularly because the percentage increase in executive pay has exceeded
share-price increases, as well as GDP growth rates,32 commanding ever


21 Id. at 20.
22 “[J]ournalists need to do a better job of making the distinction between people

like Bill Gates or actual entrepreneurs who start something and build something, and then
executives who are hired hands, essentially hired to serve at the shareholders’ bidding.”
Matthew Bishop et al., The Media and Executive Compensation: A Panel Discussion, 30
J. CORP. L. 795, 800 (2004).
23 Steel Merger Plot Is Alleged in Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1930.
24 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
25 In a 1939 public opinion poll, more than half of the respondents felt that
executives were overpaid. “No one . . . could be worth $15,000 a year [$220,000 in 2008
dollars].” Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The
Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1992, at 28–29.
26 Id. at 28.
27 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 191 (1986).
28 See id. at 191–94.
29 See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Campaign ’92: From Quayle to Clinton, Politicians Are
Pouncing on the Hot Issue of Top Executives’ Hefty Salaries, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1992,
at A14.
30 See id.
31 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
32 Real GDP grew between 2.1% and 3.1% between 2003 and 2007 (and declined in
2009), while the Dow Jones Index grew by 25% in 2003, by 3.1% in 2004, declined
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larger portions of the firms’ profits. Since 2000, average executive pay levels
have been between 300 and 500 times greater than pay received by average
workers. Average CEO salaries have topped $10 million almost every year
since 2000, while the most egregious outliers often received salaries twenty
times that of the average CEO.33
However, it was not until the financial crisis that started in earnest in
September 2008 that the pressure of shareholders, unions, the public, and the
media elevated disputes about executive pay to national prominence.
Executive salaries have been challenged not only for being excessive, but
also for rewarding their recipients when those executives exposed their
companies to a significant risk of large losses. Those losses threatened
corporate viability and the viability of the economy as a whole.34 The
argument that compensation brought about the crisis legitimized efforts to
regulate executive pay and pressured federal and state governments to do
something about executive pay.
Critics of the existing regime have pointed to pay-setting practices that
consistently produce excessive executive pay packages and provide



marginally in 2005, grew again by 16% in 2006, by 6.4% in 2007, and lost 34% in 2008.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep’t Comm., National Economic Accounts,
National Income and Product Accounts Table, Tbl. 1.1.1. Percent Change from Preceding
Period
in
Real
Gross
Domestic
Product,
available
at
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=1&ViewSeries=NO
&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=20
03&LastYear=2009&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid;
Dow
Jones
Indexes, Dow Jones Industrial Average,
https://www.djaverages.com/?view=industrial&page=reports&show=statistics&symbol=
DJI (registration needed). Cumulatively, the Dow Jones Index increased by 59% between
2003 and the end of 2007, but lost nearly all of the gain in 2008. See id. Compensation of
Fortune 500 CEOs, on the other hand, increased by a hefty 73% between 2003 and 2008.
Forbes
Staff,
CEO
Compensation,
Forbes
Mag.,
Apr.
23,
2004,
http://www.forbes.com/2004/04/21/04ceoland.html (reporting that chief executives of
Fortune 500 companies took home $3.3 billion combined or, on average, $6.6 million
individually); Scott DeCarlo & Brian Zajac, CEO Compensation, Forbes Mag., Apr. 22,
2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/22/executive-pay-ceo-leadership-compensationbest-boss-09-ceo_land.html (reporting that in total, top 500 executives earned $5.7 billion
in 2008, which averages to $11.4 apiece).
33 See Scott DeCarlo, Top Paid CEOs, FORBES, Apr. 30, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/30/ceo-pay-compensation-lead-bestbosses08-cxsd_0430ceo_intro.html/ (reporting average pay of $12.8 million for Fortune 500 chief
executives and $182 for Larry Ellison, chief executive of Oracle).
34 “Compensation is among the most cited causes of the financial crisis because
bonuses were often tied to short-term gains, even if those gains disappeared later on.”
Louise Story, After Off Year, Wall Street Pay Is Bouncing Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2009, at A1.
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executives incentives to take on too much risk. The following section
explains in more detail how executive pay is set and why it is the source of
so much conflict.

B. Pay-Setting Practices
Although the shareholders technically own the corporation, they do not
get to decide how much the people managing the corporation’s business will
be paid. Instead, the board of directors, which the shareholders usually elect
annually,35 hires and fires the CEO and sets his pay.36 Modern boards of
directors commonly have a special committee, called the compensation or
remuneration committee, whose duty is to evaluate performance of the
executive team and to make recommendations relating to executive pay.
In theory, executive pay should result from an arm’s length negotiation
between executives and directors, where executives bargain in their own selfinterest while directors bargain in the interest of the shareholders and the
company.37 In reality, however, executives have a fair amount of influence
over the process. A majority of corporate directors themselves acknowledged
that executive pay-setting practices are troubling.38 The compensation
committee rarely initiates proposals on incentive packages or conducts
market research on pay in peer companies. Instead, the firm’s human
resources department, often working together with accountants and
compensation consultants, usually makes the initial recommendation for pay
levels and incentive plans.39 This recommendation is then sent to the top
executives for review, and only after the CEO has given his stamp of



35 Election implies real competition. In reality, the vast majority of directors run
unopposed. Furthermore, if the company has a staggered board, directors are usually up
for re-election once every three years.
36 See Jensen et al., supra note 3, at 50. Because there are fewer than ten percent of
female CEOs among Fortune 500 companies, this Article uses the male pronoun when
referring to executives generally.
37 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of
the Issues, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 (2005).
38 In a recent survey of U.S. corporate directors, “67% said that they believe boards
are having difficulty controlling the size of CEO pay packages.” MAJORITY STAFF OF
H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON
EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS 3
(2007).
39 Jensen et al., supra note 3, at 50; Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 25 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=163914. Note that the human resources department
answers to the CEO.
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approval is the recommendation delivered to the compensation committee for
consideration.40 Although the CEO ordinarily participates in all committee
deliberations, he graciously abstains when the committee discusses his pay.41
After the committee accepts the recommendation, the entire board votes on
it. If approved, the contract binds the corporation and the executive without
shareholder or any other additional input.42
The compensation committee usually meets quarterly,43 and it is rarely
sufficiently expert and informed to be involved in the details of setting
performance goals and designing the optimal pay package.44 Empirical
evidence indicates that when directors, who are CEOs of other firms, sit on
the compensation committee they tend to pay the CEO similar to what they
receive at their firm.45 Professor Murphy reports that judgment calls by the
compensation committee consistently tend to be made in favor of the CEO.
He adds that committees tend to err on the high side and over- rather than
under-fund bonus pools, and argues that this tendency has contributed to the
continuous rise of executive compensation.46 In addition, anecdotal evidence
suggests that influential CEOs can pack the compensation committee with
people who are likely to approve large pay packages.47 Soon after retiring,
Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric, was asked at a boot camp
for new CEOs whom to appoint as chairman of the compensation committee.
He answered:
Put someone in charge who is nearing the end of their career, so they’re not
jealous of you as a younger CEO, is immensely rich, much richer than you,
and enjoys seeing other people get rich. . . . Never, ever make a
distinguished academic your compensation committee chair because you’ll
be a poor man by the end of it.48


40 Id.
41 Id.

42 Even if a company allows shareholders a say-on-pay vote, their vote does not bind
the board of directors.
43 See, e.g., Microsoft, Microsoft Corporation Compensation Committee Charter,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/companyinformation/corporategovernance/committees/
compensation.mspx/ (last visited May 1, 2009).
44 See Jensen et al., supra note 3, at 51; Murphy, supra note 39, at 25.
45 See Murphy, supra note 39, at 25.
46 See id.
47 See Bishop et al., supra note 22, at 796–97.
48 Id.
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When the firm hires a new executive from outside, the process is more
complex and even more likely to lead to overpayment. When looking for a
new CEO, corporate directors usually hire a search firm to identify the most
promising candidates. Negotiations about pay generally do not begin until a
single individual has been selected for the position.49 At this point, the board
is usually anxious to secure the candidate’s services and is unlikely to
bargain hard over pay.50 Furthermore, the candidate-executive, like a star
athlete or actor, is usually represented by a professional negotiator (i.e., an
agent), while the company rarely hires a professional to negotiate on its
behalf.51
Executive agents are able to bargain harder than any executive could on
his own behalf; they are usually able to secure generous compensation
packages for the executive, often including a significant signing bonus,
guaranteed additional bonuses, option grants, retirement benefits, perquisites,
and generous severance arrangements.52 This is particularly true when the
board delegates salary negotiations to the general counsel or the head of
human resources. These internal managers know that they will report to the
incoming CEO when negotiations are complete. This provides strong
incentives “to make their new boss pleased with his financial arrangements”
and makes it very difficult for them to “play hardball,” knowing that any
residual anger is unlikely to disappear when the deal is done.53
As the above section demonstrates, executive pay is determined without
much oversight and under significant pressures to increase pay, resulting in
systemically overpaid executives. This raises questions about efficiency and
about fairness, which affect not only the shareholders of the corporation, but
also Americans more generally.

II. CURRENT RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES ABOUT EXECUTIVE PAY
Controversies over executive compensation are frequently reported and
usually attract an inordinate amount of attention, but they are rarely resolved,


49 See Jensen et al., supra note 3, at 51.
50 Id. “This [search] procedure is a reasonable way to identify top candidates when

‘price’ is not an issue, but is clearly a recipe for systematically paying too much for
managerial talent.” Id.
51 Joseph Bachelder and his law firm, Bachelder Law Offices, are the best known
agents in the business. See Bachelder Law Offices, The Bachelder Law Firm,
http://www.jebachelder.com/ (last visited May 1, 2009).
52 Jensen et al., supra note 3, at 52 (describing the elements of a standard contract
that Joseph Bachelder negotiates on behalf of his clients).
53 Id.
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formally or informally. Conflict about executive compensation—much of it
latent—54 generates substantial costs.
The following sections explain in more detail what procedures are
available for resolving disputes about executive compensation and why they
are ineffective. This Part analyzes why so many of the disputes are never
resolved and, finally, estimates the costs of conflict over executive
compensation.

A. Challenging Executive Compensation Decisions
In contrast to employment discrimination and sexual harassment claims,
a formal complaint is even more rarely brought in the case of an excessivelypaid executive.55 Largely, this is because existing law makes it very difficult
to bring a complaint.
Deciding how much to pay top executives is a corporate action made by
the corporation’s highest body, the board of directors. Delaware, where sixty
percent of America’s public companies are incorporated, entrusts the board
of directors with management of the corporation in Section 141(a) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law.56 Delaware courts interpreted this
provision very broadly and subordinated other provisions of the Delaware
Code, including provisions specifying shareholder rights, to Section 141(a).57
The provision gives the board of directors virtually unlimited freedom to



54 Dispute resolution theory distinguishes between disputes that are formally
brought (formal disputes) and those that are never brought, but nevertheless cause
aggravation, anger, resentment, and eventually surface. In the employment context, latent
conflicts often surface in the form of lower productivity, absenteeism, and ultimately, a
full-blown strike (which, of course, is a formal dispute).
55 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
The Disney case is one of the few that survived a corporation’s motion to dismiss at the
Chancery level. Although the defendants prevailed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court, the case ultimately settled for an unspecified amount.
56 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate
of incorporation.”).
57 See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 n.7 (Del.
2008) (subordinating shareholder power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws under Section
109 to directors’ right to manage the affairs of the corporation under Section 141(a)). In
AFSCME, the Delaware Supreme Court held that under Delaware law, shareholders
cannot adopt a bylaw requiring the board to reimburse a stockholder’s “reasonable
expenses” associated with a successful campaign to elect a shareholder-nominated
director. Id. at 229.

632

NEGOTIATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN LIEU OF REGULATION

contract with executives regarding pay. Section 141(a) assumes that relying
solely on the discretion of the board of directors will result in decisions that
are better informed and less conflicted than decisions that would involve
other parties in the negotiating process. Additionally, Section 141(a) assumes
that the decision of the board of directors will be the most efficient for the
corporation and its stakeholders, despite the fact that chief executives usually
serve as chairmen of the board of directors in their company. As a result of
these assumptions, Delaware law has created few methods to dispute the
executives’ pay packages.
Delaware law provides shareholders, but not other stakeholders (e.g.,
employees and creditors), limited formal rights to challenge board decisions,
including decisions regarding executive compensation. These shareholder
rights include bringing binding and non-binding shareholder resolutions and
litigation.
Until 1992, the SEC consistently disallowed non-binding shareholder
resolutions regarding executive compensation, reasoning that such proposals
relate “‘to the conduct of the ordinary business operations.’”58 In 1992, the
SEC began allowing non-binding shareholder proposals asking the board to
establish a compensation committee. It reasoned that executive compensation
has spurred “widespread public debate” and raised “significant policy
issues.”59
Since then, the plurality of shareholder proposals (between twenty-five
and forty-five percent) addressed executive compensation.60 Few of these
proposals won majority shareholder approval, but even those that did were
rarely implemented. The board of directors can ignore expressed shareholder
preferences if, in the board’s business judgment, the board’s decision is
better for the corporation.
While shareholder proposals are precatory and do not formally bind the
board of directors, bylaw amendments proposed by shareholders would bind
the board of directors; however, they are frequently disallowed. The
Delaware Supreme Court recently held that shareholders could not make
proposals that would guide (or restrict) the board’s exercise of its business



58 Reebok Int’l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,131, at *1 (Mar. 16, 1992) (quoting Rule 14a-8(c)(7)).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Georgeson, 2007 Annual Corporate Governance Review 12 (2008),
available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2007.pdf (reporting that
between 2003 and 2007, shareholders brought between 96 and 179 proposals about
executive compensation, constituting no fewer than 24.9% and 42.9% of all shareholder
proposals).
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judgment, even where there is evidence that the board is self-interested.61 As
a result, shareholders cannot adopt bylaws that would restrict the board’s
business judgment in setting executive compensation. Perhaps a charter
amendment limiting board authority in setting executive pay would survive
judicial scrutiny and could be submitted to a shareholder vote,62 but
shareholders cannot unilaterally propose charter amendments. Under
Delaware law, “shareholders may not vote on [a charter amendment] unless
the board first elects to have such a vote.”63
Delaware law also places almost insurmountable obstacles in front of
shareholder lawsuits that challenge executive compensation.64 Professor
Gordon identified three related obstacles to judicial oversight. First, in 1979
the Delaware Supreme Court relaxed the standard of review for stock option
plans: it replaced “reasonableness” with “waste,” which is a very difficult
standard for the shareholders to meet.65 Second, Delaware courts do not
scrutinize compensation decisions any closer than they do other board
decisions where conflicts of interest are not present.66 Third, Delaware courts
developed significant procedural barriers to bringing shareholder suits
challenging compensation practices.67 As a result, “few, if any cases
involving large public firms were heard on the merits.”68 By imposing
procedural barriers, however, Delaware courts “blinded themselves to the
developing problems in that area, in particular the de facto constraints on
board independence in compensation setting.”69 Since 2000, Delaware courts


61 See AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 240.
62 I say “perhaps” because AFSCME suggests that even a charter amendment

limiting board business judgment might not be permitted under Delaware law. Id.
63 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 844 (2005).
64 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 779–83 (2002).
65 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s
the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis”, 30 J. CORP. L. 675,
690 (2005).
66 Id. at 690–91 (In trying to avoid “the thicket of judicially determined
compensation levels, the Delaware courts missed the separate question of adequacy of
board process in light of management’s self-interest and influence in compensation
setting.”).
67 Id. at 691.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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decided only six cases challenging the amount of executive compensation,70
and they decided another five challenging stock option awards.71 Of these
eleven cases, the plaintiffs prevailed in only two.72
Unable to sue or guide the decisionmaking of an existing board of
directors, the only other “dispute resolution” mechanisms available to
shareholders are exit, (selling their shares) or launching an expensive proxy
fight to replace the current directors with their own director-nominees.
Neither of these mechanisms is effective. Exit through the sale of stock is
likely to send a weak signal because other economic news disguises the
effect. In addition, unless investors move from stock to other assets, exit is
not possible when most corporations similarly overpay their executives.73
A proxy fight is difficult and expensive to conduct,74 and it is a very
imperfect instrument to control executive compensation.75 It bundles together
the decision about compensation with another important decision: to replace


70 Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117 (Del. 2006); In re infoUSA,

Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2007); Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 921
A.2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007); Cronin v. AmBase Corp., No. 342-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
131 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2005); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated
Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122 (Del. Ch. Aug.
24, 2004); In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
71 Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433 (Del Ch. 2008); La. Mun. Police Employees’
Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 2608-VCN, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 138 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 2, 2007); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., No. 1106-CC, 2007 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 120 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2007); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch.
2007); Criden v. Steinberg, No. 17082, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50 (Del. Ch. Marc. 23,
2000).
72 In Cronin, the chairman, president, and CEO (all one person) had secured a salary
equal to ten percent of the corporation’s market capitalization. Cronin, 2005 Del. Ch.
LEXIS at *17. For the sake of comparison, even at current severely depressed prices, to
satisfy the ten percent test, Citigroup’s CEO would have to receive $214 million in
annual compensation (the lowest since August 1982) without court sanction. See NYSE
Euronext, Listings Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_all_overview.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
73 In his groundbreaking book, Albert O. Hirschman explains how competition,
under certain conditions, does not lead to socially optimal equilibria but, rather,
suboptimal equilibria. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21–43 (1970).
74 Bebchuk reports that between 1996 and 2002 there were on average only eleven
proxy fights per year and only two in companies with market capitalization greater than
$200 million. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59
BUS. LAW. 43, 45–46 (2003).
75 See Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 63, at 857.
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incumbent directors with a rival team.76 Shareholders might be unhappy with
the executive’s paycheck but quite satisfied with the board’s work overall.
Even if they are somewhat dissatisfied with the incumbent board, they will
often be reluctant to replace the devil they know with the devil they do not.
Because the chances of prevailing are tiny, very few formal disputes are
ever brought. But, as the following sections will demonstrate, the absence of
formal disputes does not mean that latent conflict about executive pay is
insignificant, nor that it is costless.

B. Disputes About Executive Pay: Latent v. Formal
Executive pay engenders much conflict and consumes vast amounts of
resources and time. In 2008, much of shareholder activism focused on
executive pay,77 and the trend is not new. Except for one year between 2003
and 2007, the plurality of shareholder proposals (more than thirty-five
percent of all proposals brought) targeted executive compensation.78
Shareholders asked corporations to abolish stock options, to change the
option granting process, to limit executive retirement plans and golden
parachutes, to recoup bonuses in case of a restatement, to cap compensation,
and finally, to have a “say on pay.”79 These shareholder proposals achieved
very little, mostly because none are binding on the board of directors.
Conflict over executive pay regularly enters congressional debate. Over
the years, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
conducted hearings on excessive pay and heard calls for action.80 It
conducted independent investigations and required CEOs of major U.S.
corporations, including Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and Countrywide, to testify
before it. Despite its efforts, the Committee did not propose meaningful
reforms but largely appeased the public demand for shaming executives.
Finally, many of the major newspapers have written extensively about
executive pay at large publicly-traded corporations.81 Recently, the Wall


76 Id.
77 See Latham & Watkins, Webinar, Executive Compensation Challenges in the

2008
Proxy
Season
(Jan.
30,
2008),
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2102_1.pdf.
78 Georgeson, supra note 60, at 12.
79 Id. at 30–32.
80 COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4463&cati
d=43 (last visited May 1, 2009).
81 Smaller corporations, controlled corporations, LLCs, and partnerships are not the
focus of this Article. Executive pay tends to be lower in smaller companies. In addition,
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Street Journal ran a six page special report about executive pay,82 and since
1971 Fortune Magazine has published a special section on executive pay.83
The Wall Street Journal also won the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for public service,
the most prestigious of the Pulitzer Prizes, for reporting about backdated
stock options.84 The New York Times Online has a special page devoted to
executive pay that it features on its front page during proxy season.85
Although there may be few formal disputes about executive pay,
shareholder activism, congressional action, and media reporting suggest that
substantial latent conflict about executive pay generates large costs.

C. The Costs of Executive Pay
The existing system for setting executive compensation generates
substantial costs. These costs arise from compensation that is excessive and
inefficient and from disputes that arise because of excessive and inefficient
compensation. Excessive and inefficient compensation generates direct costs
because executives are paid more than they would be willing to accept to do
the same job.86 Excessive and inefficient compensation also generates
indirect costs: costs of disputes over executive compensation, including
shareholder resolutions (“say on pay”) and litigation, lowered employee
morale, and negative publicity. Finally, the existing regime for setting
executive pay generates substantial social costs by incentivizing executives
to focus on short-term performance at the expense of long-term profitability.
Although this Article focuses on disputes about compensation, the
collateral effects of compensation practices that create excessive and
inefficient pay packages ought to be evaluated as part of the existing regime



there are fewer parties involved so conventional dispute resolution mechanisms are both
more likely to be used and succeed.
82 The Hay Group CEO Compensation Survey (A Special Report), WALL ST. J., Apr.
9, 2007, at R1–R6.
83 See Bishop et al., supra note 22, at 799.
84 See The 2007 Pulitzer Prize Winners, Public Service,
http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2007_Public_Service/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
85 See Times Topics, Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/executive_pay/index.html.
86 Despite their kicking and screaming about leaving for private equity firms and
hedge funds if their pay is restricted, the vast majority of CEOs stayed put in 2006 and
2007 when private equity managers regularly collected several hundred million dollars in
annual compensation and some received more than a billion. Today, in early 2010,
private equity and hedge fund returns have been significantly lower and riskier, and fund
managers continue to receive little pay because of the “high watermark” provisions in
fund documents.
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for setting executive pay. This Article assumes that a more effective regime
for resolving disputes about executive compensation would likely affect not
only the process for determining what executives ought to be paid, but also
the outcomes.
Direct costs of excessive executive compensation are astonishing.
Bebchuk and Fried estimate that the top five executives at American public
corporations received a total of $351 billion between 1993 and 2003, or close
to ten percent of the companies’ aggregate net earnings.87 This figure reflects
only the base salary, bonuses, and stock option or restricted stock awards, as
disclosed by the firms in their annual proxy statements. The figure does not
include many other types of compensation, including executive pension
plans, deferred compensation arrangements, post-retirement perks, golden
parachutes, and signing bonuses. There is evidence that these non-disclosed
payments are also significant: one study estimates the actuarial value of CEO
pensions at one-third of the total compensation (equity and non-equity) the
CEOs received during their entire service as CEOs.88
In addition, the existing regime also produces compensation packages
that provide weak or perverse incentives for executives. First, there is
substantial empirical evidence that executives’ annual pay—salaries,
bonuses, and stock options—is only very loosely related to performance.
Executives are paid well whether or not their companies do well and often
when their companies have done poorly.89 Second, golden parachutes and
retirement packages are unrelated to performance but often make it more
valuable for the CEO to retire than to continue working. Third, stock option
awards, even when they are not being reloaded,90 spring-loaded,91 or
backdated,92 provide executives with incentives that diverge from those of


87 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 37, at 10.
88 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP.

L. 823, 847–48 (2005).
89 See, e.g., Kathy Kristof, How CEOs Steal From Your 401(k), MSN MONEY, Mar.
2, 2009, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/Media
Mentions/03-02-09_MSNMoney.pdf (reporting that although KB Home lost $929 million
in 2007, the board of directors awarded the CEO a discretionary bonus of $6 million and
a total compensation package of $16.4 million).
90 Stock options are canceled and then reissued at a lower exercise price after a large
stock price decline. See Murphy, supra note 38, at 16.
91 Spring-loaded options are stock options issued just before announcement of good
news.
92 Back-dated options are stock options dated prior to the date that the company
actually granted the option, at the lowest exercise price.
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the shareholders. Stock option values increase with stock-price volatility.93
As a result, executives with options are encouraged to take bigger risks,94
even though as managers they are supposed to manage against volatility.95
Options provide “perverse incentives to focus on short-term results to the
detriment of long-term performance.”96
Large and inefficient compensation packages also have negative effects
on the performance of non-executive employees. The rapidly increasing ratio
between what executives are paid and what rank-and-file employees receive
(from approximately 42:1 in 1980 to above 300:1 in 2008)97 resulted in
important and significant indirect social costs.98 The tremendous pay gap
creates perceptions of injustice and inequality on the part of workers.99
Perceptions of injustice, in turn, affect employee morale, disrupt teamwork,
reduce productivity, and increase absenteeism.100 Lowered morale, in
addition, reduces loyalty among workers and makes it harder for companies
to retain employees, resulting in increased costs for training and
replacement.101
The perception of injustice also increases monitoring costs for
employers.102 Employees who believe they are not being treated fairly are
more likely to shirk when they are not being watched. Preventing employee


93 Stock options are valuable only when they are “in the money.” For example, a call

stock option—i.e., the right to buy stock for a set price—is worthless unless the market
price for the stock is higher than the exercise price. The longer the time during which the
option can be exercised and the greater the volatility of the stock price, the more likely it
is that at some point during the validity of the option the exercise price will be lower than
the market price, and the more valuable the option. It is worth noting that volatility
generally reduces asset prices (except for options). The more volatile the value, the more
risky the asset and the lower the price.
94 Murphy, supra note 39, at 18.
95 See Bishop et al., supra note 22, at 800.
96 Bebchuk, supra note 14.
97 The ratio peaked in 2000 at 525:1. AFL-CIO, 2008 Trends in CEO Pay,
http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/pay/index.cfm/ (last visited May 1,
2009).
98 See Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for C: The
Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 115, 142 (2002).
99 See id.
100 Id. at 147; COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 17, at 6 (identifying lack of
productivity, low morale, and withholding knowledge as some of the ways in which
conflict manifests itself in organizations).
101 Stabile, supra note 98, at 148.
102 Id.
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waste requires increased monitoring, which is not only costly but also breeds
a “destructive atmosphere of distrust.”103
Although formal disputes over executive compensation are rare, they
nevertheless generate substantial costs. Every year, shareholders spend $35
million bringing non-binding shareholder proposals about executive pay.104
In addition, litigation expenses, although difficult to estimate, are likely to
amount to tens of millions of dollars per year. Congressional hearings, too,
are costly, as is media research.105
Conflict over executive pay also generates substantial opportunity costs:
it costs congressional time, executives’ time, and shareholders’ time—time
they could use more productively. A corporate law practitioner estimates that
executives spend about a third of their working time on “governance-type
issues,” including discussing their compensation packages, instead of
minding the corporation’s business.106 Less visible costs, including distorted
incentives that brought down venerable Wall Street banks, wiped out twenty
years of profits, lowered employee morale, resulted in poorer product
quality,107 and are much harder to measure.108



103 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24
J. CORP. L. 869, 884 (1999).
104 Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC’s Shareholder Access Proposal
7 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
03-22, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ed=470121
(estimating that all shareholder proposals combined cost companies $90 million in 2003;
because on average thirty-five to forty percent of shareholder proposals address executive
compensation, $35 million is a fair estimate).
105 Jerry Useem, senior writer for Fortune Magazine, lamented about how difficult it
was to calculate aggregate values of executive compensation packages:

I budgeted about a week to . . . go through the numbers. Well, really it took me
about three weeks, even using outside number crunchers to even come to a credible
number. There’s so many troughs, as it were, that CEOs can feed from so getting a
credible number, a total number, is very difficult to do.

Bishop et al., supra note 22, at 801.
106 Theodore N. Mirvis, Some Inconvenient Questions (Nov. 27, 2008) (on file with
author).
107 See Douglas M. Cowherd & David I. Levine, Product Quality and Pay Equity
Between Lower-Level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive
Justice Theory, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 302, 316 (1992) (suggesting that vertical pay inequity
within an organization might be associated with poorer product quality).
108 “As regulators and shareholders sift through the rubble of the financial crisis,
questions are being asked about what role lavish bonuses played in the debacle. . . .
[Merrill Lynch’s] losses . . . all the profits that the firm earned over the previous 20
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In addition to real costs to firms, excessive pay packages also generate
reputational costs, including negative publicity and outrage. News reports
result in significant reputation and credibility costs for overpaid executives,
as well as for the companies that overpaid them. Reputation and credibility
costs include “lost business opportunities, withdrawal of job offers, flight of
capital, collapse of company stock, the derision of peers, removal from other
boards, and expulsion from social clubs and professional organizations.”109
Some of these costs are borne by culpable executives and directors who
awarded the pay package. Many costs, however, are borne by innocent
parties: the shareholders whose stock portfolios decline in value; employees,
who may lose job satisfaction because of the perceived unfairness in
compensation; and replacement executives who may find the workforce
unmotivated, disloyal, and unwilling to negotiate salary or benefits
adjustments, and the business community less willing to invest in the
company.
Several recent examples come to mind. The Home Depot received much
media notoriety because of a severance package it paid its outgoing CEO
Robert Nardelli. When he was instituted as the Home Depot’s CEO in 2000,
the Wall Street Journal published six articles. The same newspaper published
more than fifty articles about Nardelli’s $200 million severance package
when Home Depot fired him six years later.110 Although Nardelli has been
gone since January 2007, Home Depot’s reputation still suffers from
association with Nardelli and the excessive severance package he
received.111 At AIG, $165 million in retention bonuses promised and paid to
its financial products division generated much more outrage (and death
threats to individual employees) than the credit default swaps that bankrupted
the company and forced the federal government to provide $182.5 billion in
guarantees to prevent AIG’s demise.112 The public outrage and defense of



years.” Louise Story, The Reckoning: On Wall Street, Bonuses, Not Profits, Were Real,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A1.
109 Sandeep Gopalan, Abstract, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 757, 773 (2007).
110 A search on April 19, 2009 in LexisNexis for “‘Home Depot’ and Nardelli”
yielded 231 articles, published between December 6, 2000 and April 16, 2009.
111 See, e.g., Paul Ingrassia, The Auto Makers Are Already Bankrupt, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 21, 2008, at A23 (“Before that [Nardelli] was at Home Depot, where he took a $210
million departure package when the board wanted him out.”).
112 The opportunity cost of media attention is hard to estimate. If, for example,
stories about executive compensation displace coverage of conflict in the Middle East,
the costs are likely to be small since the marginal value of each story is small.
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bonuses created a toxic environment within the firm, forcing many of its
employees to leave, jeopardizing the firm’s future success.
Last, but not least, there is some indication that executive compensation
packages contributed to the current financial crisis because executives “were
paid too much for doing the wrong things.”113 Business leaders were paid to
take on excessive risk in order to increase next quarter’s profits, without
regard to long-term viability.114 Instead of focusing on producing quality
goods and services, executives “[became] consumed with earnings
management, ‘financial engineering,’ and moving risks off their balance
sheets.”115
Evidence suggests that the costs of the existing regime for setting
executive pay are significant, and include costs arising from inefficient
compensation packages themselves as well as costs of conflict that arise
because compensation packages are inefficient. Much of that conflict is
latent, though no less costly nor significant than disputes that make it to
court.
But even more significant than direct costs are opportunity costs of time
that executives, directors, and Congress spend dealing with actual and latent
conflict about executive pay; reputation and credibility costs incurred both by
parties directly involved in pay negotiations (executives and directors) and
innocent parties (shareholders, employees, etc.); and, finally, opportunity
costs of the media and the general public spent fuming about executive pay
instead of focusing on issues that matter more.116

III. A SYSTEM READY FOR A CHANGE
The process for setting executive compensation is ready for a change.
This Part describes the two possible directions for change: regulation and
negotiation. This Article suggests that the latter will produce better results



113 Samuelson & Stout, supra note 11 (arguing that executive pay packages are the
“over-arching cause” of the financial crisis).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Cf. Susan Dominus, $80,000 for a year Off? She’ll Take it!, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 2009,
at
A1;
Reader’s
Comments,
Posting of
Wage
Slave,
http://community.nytimes.com/article/comments/2009/04/13/nyregion/13bigcity.html?s=
3 (Apr. 13, 2009, 7:39 EST) (“[We have] grown weary of NYT stories that treat the
recession as an existentialist adventure that allows upper middle [class] people to explore
interesting options during their involuntary free time . . . [while] a lot of people are
actually fighting to preserve a decent way of life, one that won’t consign them and their
kids to permanent wage-slave status.”).
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than the former. Then, this Part analyzes the barriers to negotiations: why, if
a negotiated process is superior to regulation, it has not been adopted already.
Finally, this Part proposes the necessary steps to implement a negotiated
process for setting executive compensation.

A. Options for Change
It is rare for economists, lawyers, boards of directors, policymakers, and
the public to agree that imminent action is needed to solve a problem.
Executive compensation is one such problem. Economists noted that boards
of directors have consistently negotiated compensation packages that give
executives too much money to do the wrong things.117 Lawyers lamented
that arm’s length negotiations between corporate boards and executives are a
myth, and that deferring to the board of directors is not likely to produce
outcomes that are in the best interest of the shareholders or the economy as a
whole.118 Corporate directors themselves have observed that they “are having
trouble controlling the size of CEO compensation.”119 Policymakers called
pay packages “shameful,”120 and the public is of the opinion that bonuses
“for showing up at work” are “absurd, particularly at a time when so many
jobs are disappearing.”121
When so many different groups coalesce around an issue, some change is
inevitable. But the fact that there is impetus for improving the process for
setting executive compensation does not imply that the new process will be
better than the system already in place.
There are two general directions for reform that are possible and likely: a
top-down adoption of mandatory rules modifying the pay-setting regime,
subjecting pay packages to governmental oversight and substantive
restrictions, or a bottom-up voluntary adoption of improved pay-setting
practices.


117 See, e.g., Jensen et al., supra note 3.
118 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 9.
119 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 12, at 8.

120 Sheryl G. Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses
‘Shameful’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A1.
121 Dash & Glater, supra note 4 (referring to retention bonuses that AIG paid to
executives in its financial products division that lost more than 100 billion dollars on
credit default swaps).
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1. Regulating Executive Pay
There exists a lot of momentum for top-down reform of executive
compensation practices by way of government regulation. Several senators
and representatives are considering bills that would require taxation of stock
options in the year they are awarded and deny tax deductibility for
compensation “that exceeds 25 times the lowest paid worker’s wage in the
company.”122
But such reform is unlikely to satisfy anyone or resolve the problem for a
number of reasons. First, since politicians are not experts on executive
compensation, even the best considered proposals are bound to disappoint.
No matter how well thought out, any regulatory reform bill is likely to be
both under- and over-inclusive and create incentives for companies to
comply in form, but not in substance.
Second, there is reason to believe that federal legislation is unlikely to
exit the congressional process “unscathed.” After a bill is introduced in
Congress, its proponents lose control over it. Because any bill that passes
Congress is subject to severe lobbying, its proponents might find that the
final version of reform has been significantly watered down.123 This is
particularly likely for executive compensation reform, where executives are
well-organized, well-funded, and well-represented by the Business
Roundtable,124 while only 7.2% of private sector employees are still
unionized,125 and there does not exist an effective shareholder association.126


122 David R. Francis, Should CEO Pay Restrictions Spread to All Corporations?,

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 9, 2009.
123 Recent negotiations over the health care bill provide an excellent example.
124 Business Roundtable, About Us, http://www.businessroundtable.org/about/ (last
visited May 1, 2009) (“Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers
of leading U.S. companies. . . . Business Roundtable unites these top CEOs, amplifying
their diverse business perspectives and voices on solutions to some of the world’s most
difficult challenges.”).
125 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members–2009 (Jan. 22, 2010),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf/ (“The union membership
rate for public sector workers (37.4 percent) was substantially higher than the rate for
private industry workers (7.2 percent).”).
126 Carl Icahn has tried for years to organize and mobilize shareholders. He
established an organization called the United Shareholders of America with the hope of
attracting a sufficient number of supporters to “create change in Washington.” The Icahn
Report, http://www.icahnreport.com/ (last visited May 1, 2009). Despite his efforts, the
organization has not been very successful, particularly when compared with the Business
Roundtable that represents executives. There also exist organizations with a narrower
purpose. See, e.g., Investment Company Institute, Key Issues,
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Organized groups like the Business Roundtable regularly lobby Congress and
state governments behind the scenes and are very effective.
And finally, poorly considered rules may have been added to the bill.
Once a rule is adopted, it becomes difficult to amend because the impetus for
regulation largely disappears after a bill has passed.
The most recent attempt, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 [ARR Act],127 demonstrates some of the pitfalls of government
intervention.128 The ARR Act includes a limitation on executive bonuses in
banks receiving federal assistance: as long as the banks retain federal
assistance provided under the TARP, they cannot pay golden parachutes,
must limit incentive compensation of its twenty highest paid executives to
one-third of total pay, and must subject executive compensation to a
nonbinding shareholder vote.129 This provision was not included in the
original bill introduced by President Obama. The original bill proposed that
the top five executives’ base salary be capped at $500,000 but did not cap the
bonuses, addressing the concern of lawyers and economists that executives
were receiving lavish compensation packages regardless of how well their
companies did. The provision Congress passed, however, was added later by
Senator Chris Dodd and Representative Barney Frank. Commentators
criticized the limitation because, first, it does not fix the problems with
executive compensation, it caps performance-based compensation instead of
requiring that compensation be linked to performance. Second, because the
law is so punitive, it causes capital-starved banks to turn down federal
assistance, or at best, return the money sooner than is healthy for the banks
and the financial system.130 Banks repaid federal funds as soon as they were
able to, not because they were financially healthy, but because they wanted
to avoid limits on executive compensation. Citigroup, for example, attempted
to escape government regulation of compensation just before the end of 2009
by repaying the bailout funds, presumably so that it could pay high year-end



http://www.ici.org/issues/index.html/ (last visited May 1, 2009) (stating their mission as
“representing the mutual fund industry and its shareholders before Congress”).
127 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (2009).
128 See Bebchuk, Congress Gets Punitive on Executive Pay, supra note 14 (“In a
last-minute addition to the stimulus bill passed Friday, Congress imposed tight
restrictions on pay arrangements in all financial firms that . . . will receive funds from the
federal government[] . . . constraining incentive compensation, limiting it to one-third of
total pay.”).
129 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7000 et al..
130 See Story, supra note 34.
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bonuses.131 In order to pay the government back, the bank turned to public
markets to raise the money it needed. However, Citigroup was unable to raise
enough money and will remain government-controlled for at least another six
months.132 The bank’s failure suggests that executives would rather risk the
company than accept a lower salary.
In addition, the cap on bonuses has forced at least some executives to
leave federally supported banks and other publicly traded corporations
altogether.133 The bill has failed to satisfy the shareholders, who are still
paying executives for attendance, not performance; the executives, who want
to avoid punitive restrictions; and the public, who suffer because
underfunded banks are unable to provide enough credit to the economy.
For all these reasons, legislative reform is unlikely to satisfy: even when
well-meaning, it is drafted by insufficiently informed politicians, subject to
severe lobbying during the process, and usually passes substantially amended
and watered down.

2. Negotiating Executive Pay
Instead of relying on top-down reform, this Article proposes that all
involved parties would be made better off by voluntarily adopting a bottomup process: a process that includes, informs, and consults important corporate
stakeholders in designing compensation and internal governance policies.
To design the process, the parties can employ the theory of dispute
systems design (DSD), a relatively new field of alternative dispute
resolution. Unlike traditional ADR processes, DSD helps parties to think
more broadly, beyond the scope of their current dispute. DSD helps parties
consider the organizational mission, include all affected groups of
stakeholders in the dispute resolution and prevention process, deal
systematically with the stream of conflict, and increase efficiency and the
quality of the produced outcomes.
By employing DSD theory, parties can design a process to fit the
particular circumstances of the company and reduce the negative
consequences of a one-size-fits-all regulatory solution. Voluntary adoption of
a workable process by more than a small minority of corporations will, at the
least, postpone and inform subsequent federal intervention and possibly


131 See Eric Dash, Government Reconsiders Quick Sale of Citigroup Stake, N.Y.

Dec.
16,
2009,
at
B1,
available
at
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/business/global/17citi.html?ref=business/.
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., Jake DeSantis, Dear A.I.G., I Quit!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A29
(letter of resignation by DeSantis, Executive VP of AIG financial products unit).
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preempt it altogether. This will serve the interests of all stakeholders,
executives in particular.
In addition to avoiding federal intervention, executives who initiate
negotiations with interested parties will be rewarded by positive media
coverage,134 increased investment, and more leeway to pursue long-term
business goals. A participatory pay-setting process, particularly if coupled
with initiatives to improve governance and performance of employees, could
also work very well.
Bottom-up reform is also likely to increase the involvement of investors,
thereby reducing the need for shareholder action, increasing trust in the
corporate management, and reducing the perceived risk of the company’s
securities, thereby increasing their value. A fairer process is likely to have a
positive effect on the workforce, increasing productivity, improving
employee relations, reducing employee turnover, and lowering training and
replacement costs.135 Finally, an inclusive bottom-up process will improve
corporate reputation and increase the corporation’s ability to win future
contracts and realize new investment opportunities.136
A well-designed negotiated process is likely to bring to the surface much
of the latent conflict over executive compensation. Initially, the process
might consume more time than the existing regime, though that is hard to
believe given that executives currently spend a third of their time on
governance-related matters. But it will pay dividends in the following years
by reducing the costs associated with conflict over executive compensation:
reputational harm from negative media reports, costs associated with
defending against shareholder actions, suboptimal worker productivity, and
higher risk premiums on a corporation’s securities.
In addition to reducing latent conflict associated with executive
compensation, a bottom-up process is likely to change the balance of power
in pay negotiations. As a result, a bottom-up process is more likely to
produce compensation packages that are in line with the expectations of



134 For example, media coverage of Goldman Sachs’s negotiations with its
shareholders about compensation has been positive. See Louise Story, Goldman’s Curbs
on Bonuses Aim to Quell Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/business/11pay.html?_r=1&dbk/.
135 Cf. Caroline Rees, Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool
for Companies and Their Stakeholders 6 (Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_40_Strengths_Wea
knesses_Gaps.pdf/ (describing how a company’s inability to address human rights
violations internationally can produce low worker morale domestically).
136 See id. at 5–6.
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shareholders, the board of directors, and employees. Even if the ultimate
payout to the executives does not change, performance criteria might, as well
as the ability of parties to dispute executive salaries.

B. Barriers to Agreement and Ways to Overcome Them
Because the existing regime for setting executive pay is controversial and
costly, regulation ineffective, and the benefits of a participatory negotiated
process numerous, it is perhaps surprising that voluntary negotiations
between executives, the shareholders, and other potential stakeholders about
executive pay are not more common.
If compromise on executive pay were easy, stakeholders would already
have hammered-out mutually satisfactory agreements in all firms. However,
interest-based negotiation over executive pay is almost never used, except in
response to a shaming campaign combined with a serious stock price
decline.137 The vast majority of disputes are unresolved year after year.
Lax and Sebenius suggest that even when the situation is ripe for a
change, compromise will not be forthcoming unless it offers “enough value
to all sides,”138 and unless
the right parties have been involved, in the right sequence, to deal with
the right issues that engage the right set of interests, at the right table or
tables, at the right time, under the right expectations, and facing the right
consequences to walking away if there is not deal.139



137 After Pfizer was discredited for having paid its underperforming CEO a $213
million severance package in December 2006, its board decided to turn itself around. In
June 2007, the board announced that it would meet with representatives from some of its
largest institutional shareholders owning approximately thirty-five percent of Pfizer
stock. The meetings were intended to initiate an “[o]pen and candid dialogue” with the
shareholders and the stakeholders. The board chairman and CEO of Pfizer acknowledged
that the meetings are “very valuable and will help [Pfizer] become a better company.”
Press Release, Pfizer, Inc., Pfizer Board of Directors to Initiate Face-to-Face Meetings
with Company’s Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Policies and Practices
(June 28, 2007), available at http://www.pfizer.be/Media/Press+bulletins/Financial/PFIZ
ER+BOARD+OF+DIRECTORS+TO+INITIATE+FACE-TO-FACE+MEETINGS+WITH+COMPANY%E2%80%99S+INSTITUTIONAL+INVESTORS+O.htm.)
Pfizer instituted regular meetings with its shareholders and put in place other
mechanisms to foster communication, such as e-mail communications and investor
conferences. Id.
138 DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 3-D NEGOTIATION: POWERFUL TOOLS TO
CHANGE THE GAME IN YOUR MOST IMPORTANT DEALS 10 (2006).
139 Id. at 12.
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The prerequisites for compromise that Lax and Sebenius list are usually
called barriers to agreement. They include setup barriers, design barriers, and
tactical barriers. The following Sections analyze each type of barriers in turn,
as applied to conflict about executive compensation. Design barriers and
tactical barriers largely depend on particular circumstances, relationships,
and personalities, and are difficult to analyze in the abstract. Therefore, this
Article only provides guidelines and steps that a planner ought to take into
account to determine actual design and tactical barriers in each firm. Setup
barriers, although also subject to particular circumstances, relationships, and
personalities, can be analyzed in the abstract.

1. Setup Barriers
Setup barriers are possibly the most significant impediments to
compromise. As Lax and Sebenius explain, compromise may be difficult, if
not impossible, unless the scope of the negotiations, the sequence of
negotiations, and basic process choices favor compromise.140 Scope usually
means that the right parties must be involved in the negotiations with good
information about their interests and about their fallback, or no-deal, options.
Sequence means that the parties must be approached in the right order.
Process choices include choosing the right tools to organize the negotiation
and maximize the odds of success.141 The right tools might include
mediation, bringing in a neutral expert, sequencing negotiation, or engaging
in a consensus building exercise. The following three Sections analyze
separately two elements of scope, the parties and their interests, and their nodeal options, followed by an analysis of sequencing barriers and process
choices.

a. Scope: Real Parties and Their Interests
Lax and Sebenius point out that compromise is unlikely unless “the right
parties have been involved . . . to deal with the right issues that engage the
right set of interests.”142 A voluntary process that does not involve, at the
least, shareholder representatives, will fail. A process that does not include
employees in a corporation with large employee ownership, usually through
an employee stock ownership plan [ESOP], is also likely to fail. Because
negotiations over executive compensation occur between real individuals, not


140 Id. at 24.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 12.
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between abstract executives and boards of directors, the determination of
what parties are necessary to reach a lasting compromise will depend on the
particular circumstances of the corporation. Although no two corporations
are alike, some generalizations about party roles in the executive
compensation compromise are plausible.143
In addition, whether or not a party should be included in the negotiation
will depend on whether she has a stake in the outcome of the negotiation.
Including too few parties can undermine the legitimacy of the compromise
and reduce the positive effects that compromise promises; including too
many parties can unnecessarily complicate the negotiation and, likewise,
reduce its legitimacy.144
Understanding interests, one’s own and those of other negotiating
parties, is crucial for a successful negotiation.145 Negotiators often fail to sort
out their own interests: the “‘must-have’ from the ‘important’ and from the
‘desirable but not critical.’”146 The best negotiators are clear on their ultimate
interests, know their trade-offs among lesser interests, and are very flexible
and creative in advancing their ultimate interests.147
For example, perhaps an executive’s ultimate interest is to be able to run
a business well, and he might be willing to trade off a severance package in
exchange for more freedom to manage the business with long-term goals in
sight. Without a process that allows for trade-offs, the outcome is likely to be
suboptimal. The existing rules, for example, disable the executive from
asking the shareholders for leeway to manage the business without incessant
demands for short-term returns, in exchange for a smaller severance package.
The executive thus ends up with a million dollar golden parachute, which he
does not need and has to live with shareholder demands for short-term
profits, which he does not want. In the end, no one is satisfied: the
shareholders might have to pay a large severance package to the executive,
who lost much of the company’s value pursuing short-term boosts in
profitability that the shareholders “demanded.”
Further complicating the negotiations is the fact that shareholder
turnover is very high. The manager might reach a binding settlement with
one group of shareholders that is completely replaced within a year. But
corporate law already gives managers a substantial amount of leeway with
regard to their performance of their duties. In addition, most corporate law


143 See infra Tbl. 1.
144 See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 138, at 66–67.
145 See id. at 70–71.
146 Id. at 70.
147 Id. at 71.
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rules are default and can be changed if so provided in the corporate charter.
The only real concern for the manager is a takeover, but the concern is small.
Not only can managers effectively reduce the likelihood to close to zero by
adopting takeover defense measures, they can also codify their agreement
with pre-existing shareholders in the charter, thus delaying a successful
acquirer’s ability to unilaterally undo the agreement and improve their own
bargaining position.
Although the ranking of interests for individual parties will be different
in each corporation, a typical party’s interests can be generalized, to some
extent. Individually, some executives might be more interested in being paid
at least as well as their industry peers, others might prefer lower but stable
compensation with generous retirement benefits, and still others may be
willing to forego stock options in exchange for being able to use the
company jet on private business. The table below cannot identify individual
interest priority lists; it provides a roadmap that corporations can employ to
ferret out the interests that are most important, identify those that are less
important in the given case, and thereby find room for agreement.
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Table 1. Parties and Their Interests
PARTY
Executives

ROLE
x run the company,
make decisions
that affect the
business
x negotiate
compensation on
their own behalf
(or represented by
an agent)

INTERESTS
x high pay for hard work and
contribution to business
enterprise
x ability to run a business
effectively (productive
employees, access to capital,
innovation, etc.)
x ability to pursue long-term
goals instead of constantly
worrying about quarterly results
x pay that signals prestige and
high status compared to peers
x downside protection in bad
economic times
x increasing trust among investors
x good reputation
x prevent individual shareholders
from interfering with day-today operations

HR
Department

x design pay
package on behalf
of executives

x do what executives want to
avoid conflict and keep their
own jobs

Compensation
Committee

x negotiate
x negotiate a pay package that
compensation with
will please executives, who will
executives on
hire the consultant again
behalf of the board
of directors
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Board of
Directors

x approve
compensation
package (by vote)

x negotiate a pay package that
best furthers the interests of the
shareholders
x being reelected
x furthering organizational
mission
x preserve own reputation and the
company’s reputation
x avoid conflict

Shareholders148 x owners of
corporation
x no direct role in
pay negotiations

x long-term returns (pensions
funds, family investors)
x short-term returns (hedge funds,
mutual funds, day traders)
x shared interest: not overpay
executives, but provide the right
incentives
x shared interest: more
information and more say about
what corporations do with
investors’ money

Employees

x fair compensation for
themselves and executives
x being recognized as part of the
team
x job security (avoid layoffs or
bankruptcy)
x pride in the company and the
job

x no direct role in
pay negotiations
x often own stock in
the company


148 There is an image that U.S. public companies are owned by millions of lay

shareholders, who are unable to make informed decisions about what is best for the
company. But this image is incorrect: as professor Black explains, “the model of public
companies as owned by thousands of anonymous shareholders simply is not true. There
are a limited number of large shareholders, and they know each other.” Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 574 (1990).
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Compensation
Consultants
Federal
Government

x advise
compensation
committee on
executive pay
x regulates
commerce
x levies taxes
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x being hired by company to
provide advice on executive
compensation
x a system of compensation that
is efficient and fair: provides
the incentives for executives to
take reasonable risk without
externalizing the cost
x avoid passing judgment on
individual pay packages
x economic growth

State
Governments

x regulate
corporations

x Delaware: do nothing that
would cause corporations to flee
the jurisdiction
x New York: strict enforcement
of state securities laws against
(mostly non-NY) corporation

Other
Stakeholders
(creditors,
suppliers,
customers)
Media

x no direct role

x varied interests
x shared interest: avoid
bankruptcy and provide
executives incentives to grow a
productive business
x publicity and increased
advertising revenues: negative
stories about executive
compensation do not sell ads,
but may sell more copies

x no direct role, but
potentially
influential

As of December 2008, only 36.9% of all equity in U.S. corporations was
held by individuals; 62.6% was held by institutional investors (11.2% foreign
and 51.4% domestic).149 It is true that there exist many different types of
institutional investors—the Federal Reserve identifies eleven—that have
different interests: pension funds are interested in stable long-term returns to


149 See FED. RES. SYS., THIRD QUARTER 2008, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE

UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 90 (2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/z1/20081211/z1r-1.pdf.
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satisfy their long-term obligations, while mutual funds may be more
interested in shorter-term returns. Within groupings, different funds may
have different goals. But there may only be a couple different institutional
investors of any significance in each firm. Wal-Mart, the world’s largest
company, for example, is owned by the Walton family and corporate insiders
(forty-four percent) and by 1353 different institutional investors (thirty-nine
percent).150 However, only two institutions own more than two percent of
Wal-Mart, and only seven own more than one percent.151 The ownership
structure of institutional holders is similar for other large corporations, like
Chevron and Exxon, and smaller corporations tend to have even more
concentrated ownership.152 If singling out institutional investors by size is
insufficient, firms could select a representative institution from each largest
group. For example, if mutual funds own a large stake, the largest mutual
funds could be asked to participate.
Finally, even individual shareholders are not all likely to be uninformed
laypersons or disinterested, diversified shareholders. Contrary to popular
belief, many large U.S. public companies have significant individual or
family owners. According to a recent study, in thirty-seven percent of
Fortune 500 companies,153 an individual or a family owns at least five
percent, and in twelve percent the family is the largest shareholder and owns
at least twenty percent of the firm’s stock.154 For example, firms with
significant insiders include Microsoft (Bill Gates), Hewlett-Packard (Bill
Hewlett and David Packard), Time Warner (Ted Turner), New York Times
(Ochs-Sulzberger family), Washington Post (Graham family), and Berkshire
Hathaway (Warren Buffet and his wife).
The above table makes possible three preliminary conclusions. First,
many parties may be interested in the outcome of the executive compensation
negotiation, but not all should be involved in the negotiation. Although
compensation consultants benefit from the current setup, they have no


150 Yahoo! Finance, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=wmt/

(last visited May 1, 2009).
151 Id. The eighth largest institution owns 0.68%. Id.
152 To pick just one, the ten largest shareholders of J.Crew hold 76.49% of shares.
Daily Finance, J. Crew Group, Inc. Institutional Ownership,
http://dailyfinance.com/company/j-crew/jcg/nys/institutional-ownership (last visited Mar.
27, 2010).
153 The Fortune 500 list includes the 500 largest U.S. corporations measured by their
gross revenue.
154 Belén Villalonga & Raphael H. Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control, and
Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385, 413 (2006), available at http://w
ww.people.hbs.edu/bvillalonga/VillalongaAmitJFE2006.pdf.
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credible interest in a particular compensation decision; rather, they are
interested in being paid to provide expert advice on compensation. Human
resources departments, too, provide advice only and are not affected by the
outcome of the negotiation.
Second, the table identifies parties with similar interests that are likely to
form coalitions in a negotiation: shareholders, employees, and the federal
government are a plausible coalition, interested in keeping executive
compensation in check; Delaware and boards of directors, on the other hand,
are interested in giving the directors freedom to approve whatever
compensation package they believe will best further the business interests of
the company.
Third, the table demonstrates that each party can have a number of
conflicting interests that are not all going to be equally important in each
case. A board of directors in a corporation with a single large shareholder is
likely to be very responsive to the interests of that shareholder. Without the
large shareholder’s support, directors are unlikely to be re-elected. In
addition, directors with good reputations to protect are likely to want to avoid
visible conflict with an important shareholder: it may generate bad publicity
and make life in a boardroom unpleasant.155 A board of directors in a
corporation with dispersed ownership, on the other hand, will be more
interested in satisfying the executives, who control the director nomination
process.

b. Scope: No-Deal Options
The deal/no-deal balance under current law is stacked heavily in favor of
the executives. They are able to extort virtually unlimited pay packages and,
if dissatisfied, are able to walk away with millions in severance payments.
But the current financial crisis and the role that executive compensation
arguably played in it have dramatically changed the no-deal options of the
parties involved.
Considerable evidence suggests that a party is more likely to agree to a
proposal, and on less attractive terms, the worse his no-deal option—that is,
refusing to negotiate—appears.156 Conversely, the better the perceived no-


155 Considering how concerned boards of directors are about being placed on

CalPERS’s Focus List of underperforming companies, coming under the fire of a large
and important shareholder is unlikely to be a place where board members would like to
be.
156 James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk
First?, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS 333 (Richard J.
Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996).

656

NEGOTIATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN LIEU OF REGULATION

deal option, the less likely a party is to begin and continue negotiations.
Therefore, what matters is not the actual alternative to a deal, but the
perceived alternative, and perceptions often do not match reality.
Overoptimism about one’s own alternatives, and perception that the other
side’s alternatives are worse than they are can derail negotiations where a
deal could be struck.
No-deal options or best alternatives to a negotiated agreement
(BATNAs) are often perceived and described as fixed walk-away prices. But,
as Lax and Sebenius demonstrate, calculating the deal/no-deal balance in an
ongoing process, no-deal options, and perceptions of no-deal options in
particular, are likely to “evolve and shift,”157 and they are not limited to
prices, but may include other valuable interests. No-deal options are
particularly likely to change as the process continues in a multiparty
negotiation, where early agreement among some parties may worsen the nodeal option of the other parties.158
In an executive compensation decision, the perception of one’s own and,
in particular, other parties’ deal/no-deal options will depend largely on
available information of what the other party is actually willing to do. Will
the executive, if displeased with the negotiation, walk away unless he
receives a guaranteed $20 million? Or will he accept a lower salary, but with
a higher potential pay-out if the company achieves target goals? Will the
shareholders ask the state Attorney General to prosecute the chief executive
and the board of directors if they approve a disfavored pay package? Or will
they let the decision stand?
The table below generalizes the initial deal/no-deal options for different
parties before and after the financial crisis. After a negotiation starts,
however, the no-deal options are likely to change.


157 LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 138, at 28.
158 Sebenius, supra note 156, at 333.
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Table 2. No-Deal Options and Bad-Deal Consequences Before the
Financial Crisis and After
PARTY
Executives

x

x

x

Board of
Directors

x

x

BEFORE CRISIS
If no deal with board of
directors: good. If pay
negotiations are not
successful, executive can
retire from the company,
usually leaving with
millions in severance.
If no deal with the
shareholders: good. No
reason to negotiate unless
corporation’s reputation
has been tarnished
(Pfizer).159
Able to negotiate almost
any salary up to 10% of
corporations’ market
capitalization.
If no deal with
executives: poor. Few
boards have succession
plans in place and are
willing to risk the media
attack for letting a
competent executive
leave over money.
If no deal with the
shareholders: good. No
reason to negotiate with
shareholders, except in
firms with large
shareholders or groups of
shareholders due to
concern about reelection.

AFTER CRISIS
x May still walk away with
severance, but
“unreasonable”
compensation may be taxed
at 90%, tarnish the
executive’s reputation and
limit his exit options.
x State Attorney General
might criminally prosecute
executive.
x Congress might cap pay,
require detailed disclosure,
and make life difficult for
executives & few good job
alternatives.
x “Unreasonable”
compensation likely to be
publicly exposed Æ
reputation costs & increased
risk of litigation.
x Congress might regulate
pay, making it more
difficult to hire competent
executives.


159 See Press Release, Pfizer, Inc., supra note 137 (discussing how Pfizer felt

compelled to meet with its shareholders and discuss possible improvements to the firm’s
governance after some heavily-publicized corporate governance failures).
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Shareholders

Employees

Federal
Government

x Usually do not get to
negotiate.
x File a lawsuit with a tiny
chance of success
x Bring a shareholder
proposal with a tiny
chance of success.
x Vote against directors,
which may be effective
threat if large shareholder.
x Do not get to negotiate.
x Threaten to strike, of
which effectiveness and
likelihood depends on the
industry (neither very
high).
x If shareholders, same as
above under shareholders.
x Regulate, but face severe
opposition by
shareholders and
executives alike if
attempted.

x (Threaten to) lobby
Congress for regulation.
x Lobby state Attorney
General to prosecute
executives.

x Strike unlikely in current
economic times, unless
business is insolvent and
there is nothing to lose.
x Lobby prosecutors to bring
criminal charges.

x Regulation more acceptable,
but would still face severe
lobbying.
x Important political
constituencies have
different views on
regulation; no law will
satisfy everyone: “damned
if you do and damned if you
don’t.”

The effectiveness of the shareholders’ no-deal option—threatening with
federal regulation—depends also on the behavior of other corporations. This
Article assumes the more corporations that adopt effective voluntary
processes to set executive compensation, the less likely is federal regulation
(and the less restrictive it will be if passed). If only a few corporations are
willing to amend voluntarily their pay-setting practices, federal regulation is
more likely. But if federal regulation is likely, then few executives will be
willing to negotiate with the shareholders, the employees, etc., because there
may be no benefit to negotiating, assuming that regulation will supersede any
negotiated agreement. Imperfect information about likely actions of other
corporations creates a situation called the “collective action problem”:
rational choice leads corporations to defect, i.e., refuse to adopt a voluntary
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process, even though each corporation’s and party’s individual reward would
be greater if everyone played cooperatively.
Because real executives can continue to communicate with other
companies and with the federal government, the prisoner’s dilemma is
unlikely to affect severely their decision of whether to initiate voluntary
negotiations. As they try to figure out whether and how to structure their
process, they will likely have information about what other companies are
doing.

c. Sequence and Process Choices
Current law places relatively few process barriers in the way of the
executives, the board of directors, or the shareholders interested in
negotiating executive pay. A company that wants to include the stakeholders
in the process for setting executive pay is allowed, under Delaware law, to
include as many parties as necessary in the process for setting executive
compensation, so long as the board of directors does not divest itself of its
authority to decide what an executive should be paid. The business judgment
rule, as adopted in Delaware, does not prohibit the board of directors from
considering opinions of interested parties, or compensation consultants for
that matter, in making its decision.160
Barriers associated with sequence and process choices are more difficult
to identify in the abstract than parties, their interests, and their no-deal
options. The party interested in reaching a negotiated solution will look to
put in place the best sequence by which to involve different potential parties
in order to increase the likelihood of success.161
In corporations subject to existing federal restrictions on executive pay
(e.g., TARP recipients and banks in general), the most difficult party to
negotiate with is likely to be the federal government itself. Other parties will
need to consider whether to approach the federal government right away, to
ascertain what actions might be exempt from the reach of the regulation, or
whether internal consensus should precede negotiations with the federal
government. The sequence will vary from corporation to corporation.
Sometimes, the shareholders may want to begin negotiations directly with the
party with opposing interests, the executive, and then proceed with their
natural allies. At other times, different groups of shareholders may start the



160 The business judgment rule requires and allows directors to consider the effect of
their decision on the corporate enterprise, which includes “‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally).” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
161 See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 138, at 29.
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process by forming coalitions amongst themselves, then negotiating with the
board of directors who, in turn, will negotiate with the executives.
The process to determine the right sequence might be complicated and
involved, Lax and Sebenius warn. Parties need to search broadly among
“internal, external, actual and potential parties” to the negotiation; they need
to figure out the relationships between these individuals and groups,
“especially who defers to whom, and who influences whom, positively or
negatively.”162 This will be particularly important among different
shareholders who, as identified above in Table 1, may have very different
interests. Then the planner must focus on the most-difficult-to-persuade party
and figure out who must say “yes” before that party will agree and then
continue backward from the most difficult to the least difficult party.163
Finally, the planner must decide whether to negotiate with parties together or
separately, privately or publicly, and carefully manage the information
flow.164

2. Design Barriers and Tactical Barriers
“An inadequate deal design can impede, or even preclude, progress.”165
Parties are more likely to begin negotiations if they believe they will be made
better off by negotiating than not. Zero-sum negotiations are likely to break
down quickly, particularly in the executive compensation realm, where the
parties could believe that their no-deal options are either very good for them
or very bad for the other side. Executives might believe that their no-deal
option is a rich golden parachute, while the shareholders might believe that
their no-deal option is to lobby the federal government to confiscate the
payment by imposing a high tax on it. To make compromise more likely, the
planner will need to show the parties how the value of a compromise exceeds
the value of the alternatives. He can do that by following these design
principles:
1. Probe behind what are apparently incompatible bargaining positions to
understand the full set of interests at stake for all parties.166
2. Encourage parties to probe for different interests that are easy for them to
concede in exchange for interests that they consider more valuable.167


162 Id. at 107.
163 Id. at 107–08.
164 Id. at 108.

165 Id. at 30.
166 LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 138, at 135.
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Differences include, predictions about the future (how likely is a
particular project to succeed and create value for the shareholders);168 in
attitudes toward risk (Is the executive willing to take a $1 salary in
exchange for a bonus contingent on meeting revenue and profitability
goals? Is he willing to forego a bonus for a higher guaranteed pay-out? Is
he willing to accept a claw-back requirement in exchange for a restricted
stock award?);169 attitudes toward time (receive lower compensation
today instead of higher compensation in ten years?);170 and other
possible differences including taxability, liquidity, investment expertise,
relationships, and precedents.171 A board of directors may be willing to
allow shareholder representatives to observe board meetings if that
lowers the odds of negative publicity. An executive may be willing to
meet with shareholder representatives a few times a year to hear their
ideas, respond to governance concerns, create good publicity, and avoid
time-consuming and costly legal altercations. In addition, all parties
involved can choose to publicize some parts of their compromise, for
example, that the executive is taking a one dollar salary and meets with
important shareholders once every quarter, reaping the benefits of
positive publicity, and avoiding publicity for other parts of the agreement
that are likely to attract criticism, like the fact that the executive received
pension benefits.172
3. Maximize the total net pie: by looking imaginatively and very broadly at
the interests of the parties, they will be able to find higher value
compromises.173 For example, few executives understand that their pay
package is not just their business. A poorly-designed executive
compensation package affects employee productivity and increases the
odds that good people will leave. Taking into account broader interests
will affect the structure of the executives’ pay package but might also
result in compromise with employees about aspects of their own
compensation.
Tactical and interpersonal barriers are most familiar to seasoned
negotiators. They include difficult at-the-table tactics: “hardball moves, put-


167 See id. at 123.
168 See id. at 136–38.
169 See id. at 138–41.
170 See id. at 142–43.
171 See id. at 143–44.
172 See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 138, at 125.
173 See id. at 125–28.
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downs, last-minute demands, pressure tactics, hiding information, walk-away
threats.”174 In addition, tactical barriers include communication problems
stemming from poor presentation, poor framing and poor listening, lack of
trust between parties, different styles and personalities, and, in international
corporations, cross-cultural issues.175 These barriers are likely in intracompany negotiations, but they depend almost entirely on the personality of
the parties. As a result, abstract analysis would be pointless. Carl Icahn, a
shareholder activist, and Michael Eisner, former CEO of Disney, are both
likely to be difficult negotiators, but generalizing the behavior of either to a
class of parties, shareholders or executives, would be counterproductive.
Warren Buffet, on the other hand, has a reputation for being reasonable
negotiators who do not enjoy playing games and strategic behavior.
Nevertheless, when it comes to their own compensation, all executives are
likely to be quite sensitive and less willing to negotiate than otherwise.176

C. Designing a New Process
In order to succeed, the DSD process needs to be informed and
principled. Fader identifies six steps that an entity interested in reforming its
dispute resolution process needs to take before implementing a modified
process.177 Although Fader writes about state courts, design steps are equally
applicable to a corporation looking to reform its process for settling and
disputing executive compensation awards.
1. Self-Assessment: the design process begins by identifying the interested
parties. It needs to begin with an honest and thorough investigation of the
company, its history, its goals and corporate mission, and its challenges.
The company will need to determine whether the problems of the current
situation could be ameliorated through a modified process.178


174 Id. at 32.
175 Id. at 34.
176 Recently, Robert Diamond, the president of Barclays Capital, a large U.K. bank,

was asked: “If you really love working for Barclays, why do you need that huge incentive
to do the job you are paid to do anyway?” He could not provide a good answer. Landon
Thomas Jr., Executive at Barclays Defends Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/business/global/19barclays.html?scp=2&sq=barclays&st=cse/.
177 Fader organizes the steps differently and therefore identifies seven steps, not six.
See Hallie Fader, Designing the Forum to Fit the Fuss: Dispute System Design for the
State Trial Courts, 13 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 481, 485–88 (2008).
178 See id. at 487.
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2. Getting Leadership on Board: in order for a process design effort to
succeed, parties must view the new process as a benefit to themselves.179
Barriers to agreement that are discussed above—setup barriers and nodeal options in particular—may make it difficult to convince corporate
boards and management of the benefits of a more inclusive negotiated
process. Costantino and Sickles Merchant suggest that participants be
offered incentives and rewards for taking part in the system.180 For
example, the board of directors might be willing to trade off shareholder
participation for reduced pressure to cut the R&D budget.181 In addition,
the party interested in modifying the process would be well-advised to
propose changes that are incremental and produce large benefits at a low
cost.182 For example, the executive could offer shareholders the right to
vote on executive compensation. It is a low cost concession for the
executive but yields far-reaching benefits, including improved publicity
and a means for the shareholders to voice concerns at least once per year.
3. Design process: whatever process the company adopts will depend on
who are interested parties, their interests and no-deal options, and other
barriers to agreement. In addition, the company will consider whether
and what matters in addition to executive compensation should be
included in the negotiation. For example, it could be cost-effective for a
company to combine negotiations about pay with a discussion about
dividend policy and long-term business plans.
4. Training and implementation: parties must understand the purpose of the
new process and its likely effects. Unrealistic expectations will
undermine even the best reform effort. The collective action problem—
no corporation wants to implement a new process if the federal
government will regulate compensation anyway, but if many
corporations implemented new and improved processes, federal
regulation could be avoided—might reduce the willingness of corporate
boards to initiate change. A pilot program implemented in a company
whose reputation had recently been tarnished by poor compensation
practices, for example AIG, would serve as a model and lower the
perceived risks of a new and untested process.


179 See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 17, at 92–95.
180 See id. at 189–98.

181 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 11 (noting that many firms have cut their
R&D budgets in response to shareholder pressure to produce short-term profits).
182 See Fader, supra note 177, at 487.
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5. Evaluation: the criteria for evaluation should be built into the process to
continuously collect data and make changes as appropriate: clarify goals,
determine the methodology, establish a baseline, chart progress, modify
the system, and re-clarify goals.183
6. Diffusion: if the process is deemed effective and efficient, a pilot
program can be expanded, taking into account the limits of the program’s
effectiveness.184
It is important for the company to go through all the steps. A botched
negotiated process is unlikely to produce the benefits identified above—
preempt federal regulation, lower the costs of conflict, reduce the risks of
harm to reputation, lower costs of capital, improve employee productivity,
and lower training and retention costs, etc.—and will likely produce
substantial costs.
A process that is perceived as perfunctory will further harm the
reputation of the company. Whether well-designed or not, a negotiation that
includes a number of parties will be logistically difficult and costly. The
company might have to hire a consultant to assist with the design of the
negotiation process. In addition, by creating additional opportunities to
provide input on executive pay decisions, an inclusive process is likely to
increase the costs of formal disputes. Finally, the negotiation will likely take
a substantial amount of time. Without any of the benefits, these costs do not
justify the process design effort.

CONCLUSION
Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s Chief of Staff, recently said: “Never
let a serious crisis go to waste. . . . [I]t’s an opportunity to do things you
couldn’t do before.”185
The existing system for setting executive compensation is in crisis. It
occupies the President, Congress, and the media. Time is ripe for a change.
Instead of focusing on regulatory solutions, the Article proposes intra-firm
negotiation as a possible solution to the problem of executive compensation.
This Article expands the scope for dispute systems design and suggests
that its theoretical teachings could be used to improve the process for setting
executive compensation. The Article describes how the existing process for


183 Id.
184 Id. at 488.
185 A 40-Year Wish List, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at A14.
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setting executive compensation consistently leads to overpayment, which
usually creates friction within the corporation. Existing legal rules result in
much latent conflict that is not managed at all, or, at best, is managed very
poorly, generating substantial costs. The costs include costs directly
associated with overpayment and costs of conflict that overpayment
generates: lower morale, harm to reputation, increased cost of capital, and
excessive focus on short-term results.
Because conflict about executive pay is prevalent, and the costs of
conflict significant, one would expect that corporate executives,
shareholders, directors, and other parties would have already voluntarily
reached agreement about improving executive pay practices. The fact that
corporations have not come up with better solutions is sometimes used as
evidence that the existing regime must be efficient. This Article argues that
this is not the case. It observes that barriers to compromise will prevent
corporations from initiating value-increasing negotiations and describes those
barriers in more detail as they apply to disputes about executive pay. Finally,
the Article proposes steps that a company interested in rethinking its process
for negotiating executives’ salaries should take to reduce the overall costs of
disputes about executive compensation, increase participation, and thereby
improve the system for setting executive pay.
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